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Problem Description
It is often desirable to be able to specify software security policies at the deployment stage rather
than during development. Separation of code and policy offers flexibility and encourages software
reuse as making changes becomes easier and code does not necessarily have to be recompiled
when security requirements change. Moving input validation out of the application can also help
performance, by using dedicated computing resources for validation.
Early web services standards did not address security, and a set of standards and specifications
that covers security has subsequently been developed and released. One of these specifications is
WS-SecurityPolicy, which can be used to specify message security requirements such as
encryption and signing of messages in policy files. Lack of input validation is considered one of the
greatest security threats to web applications, but is not addressed in the current web services
standards. This project will investigate whether these standards can be extended to specify and
automatically validate input parameter requirements for web services. In particular, the following
tasks will be performed:
- An examination of web services and web services security
- Design of an extension of existing web services standards that enables validation of web service
input parameters
- Development of a prototypical implementation of the design
- Elaboration of the implementation by means of an example application
Assignment given: 2006-01-16
Supervisor: Peter Herrmann, ITEM

Abstract
Accepting unvalidated input is considered today’s greatest web security
threat. This master’s thesis addresses that threat by proposing an automatic
and centralized mechanism for validating web services input. By building on
existing web services standards, the proposed solution intercepts incoming
web service requests and validates them against a security policy.
A major design goal for this work was to realize web services input
validation without modifying existing functionality. That is, the input val-
idation security mechanism should be added out of code. This is achieved
by keeping the web services and the validation mechanism separate. Input
validation configuration is accomplished by modifying a configuration file.
Even when the validation mechanism logic is correct, it may not function
as intended. Such anomalies are in most cases caused by human-introduced
errors in the configuration file, resulting in the need for a configuration file
verification tool. This thesis proposes a verification tool that quantifies the
level of security by analyzing the configuration file.
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1Chapter 1
Introduction
The demand for web services is expected to proliferate in the coming years
[1]. Web services provide a standard means of interoperation between het-
erogeneous software applications that run on a variety of platforms. Due
to their growing popularity and increasingly widespread use, many web ser-
vices standards have emerged. These standards address shortcomings in the
early standards and extend web services in numerous ways.
None of the above-mentioned and newly evolved standards has explic-
itly addressed the field of web services input validation. Several experts
on web security, among them the Open Web Application Security Project
(OWASP), consider unvalidated input to be the greatest threat to web ap-
plications [2].
Mechanisms that secure web services against unwanted input are there-
fore of high importance. Preferably, such protection should be simple to add
and its correctness and coverage should be easy to verify.
Commonly, software developers are not security experts [3]. Software se-
curity is in general a difficult area to master; this also applies to web services
security. Additionally, web services security standards have yet to mature,
and keeping up-to-date with the different standards and specifications can
be challenging.
2 1. Introduction
There are many advantages to letting experts take care of the security
aspects of an application, the foremost being that the quality of the security-
related decisions can be expected to be higher than those made by ordinary
developers.
In this thesis we propose a verifiable solution for input validation of
web services that can be configured by those responsible for security at
deployment time.
1.1 Motivating Scenario
The following scenario illustrates the need for the input validation mecha-
nism discussed in this thesis.
A small IT company develops banking applications. In order to facilitate
integration of their solutions with other suppliers’ systems, web services are
used.
Most of the developers in the company’s development department have
considerable development experience. However, only some of them have
experience from implementing security.
An analysis of the company’s existing web services has revealed that they
were developed with varying levels of security. Input validation tends to be
neglected or implemented poorly. Not surprisingly, it turns out that those
developers familiar with security have taken the most security considerations
during development. The rest of the developers have either introduced se-
curity vulnerabilities, or not addressed security issues at all. Security issues
have not been under centralized control.
In order to meet the requirements from the banking industry, the IT com-
pany has been reorganized. The development department has been split into
two separate divisions: one development division and one security division.
The security division monitors the developers and adds security mechanisms
when the developers have finished their work.
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The security division is now looking for a security mechanism that will
allow them to add input validation to new and existing web services at
deployment time.
1.2 Problem Statement
From the scenario above we extract the following problem statement:
We want to design and implement an automatic, verifiable, and central-
ized mechanism for web services input validation that can be added to and
configured for a web service at deployment time.
1.3 Related Work
Web application input validation is not a new field. In [4] and [5], emphasis is
put on SQL injection, which is only a subset of all input validation problems.
Much research has been done in the field of monitoring and protecting
web applications. Sirer and Wang [6] and Ardagna et. al. [7] both con-
sider access control issues. Kruegel and Vigna [8] look at the monitoring of
web services misuse by detecting usage anomalies, while Baresi et. al. [9]
investigate policy-based monitoring of web service compositions.
There exist several attempts at developing formal semantics for web
services [6, 10, 11]. In the two former papers, this formalization is used
for specifying security policies. In [12], Bhargavan et. al. make use of
the semantics developed in [10], and create a tool for verifying web services
security policies.
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1.4 Approach
In our introductory research, books, technical documentation, standards,
and specifications will be used as our main sources for information. Also,
reputable publishers such as IEEE, ACM, and Springer will be used as start-
ing points when searching for additional background information.
Next, our problem statement will be broken down into a series of specific
system requirements. The requirements will then be used as the basis for
system analysis and design.
Last, a prototypical implementation of the design will be developed. The
implementation will be elaborated by means of an example application.
1.5 Thesis Outline
The background of our thesis is found in chapters 2-4. Here, XML, web
services, web services security, and input validation are introduced.
Next, we proceed to the system development of our solution. In chap-
ter 5, “System Requirements”, we state the requirements of the solution.
In chapter 6, “System Analysis”, we analyze the requirements and describe
an implementation-independent architecture of the solution. In chapter 7,
“System Design”, implementational decisions are presented, and the result
is a detailed design. In chapter 8, “Implementation”, we describe our im-
plementation of the design. In chapter 9, “An Example Application”, we
demonstrate the behavior of the system in an example application.
Conclusions are drawn in chapter 10. Here we also list this thesis’ con-
tributions and suggestions for future research.
Part I
Background
5
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XML and Web Services
This chapter introduces web services as well as XML, which is the corner
stone in web services technology. Thus, understanding XML is important
for understanding web services. Further, the XML schema standard, which
will be introduced in this chapter, provides a standard means for validating
XML data.
2.1 XML
The Extensible Markup Language (XML) is a general-purpose W3C-standard
for document markup [13]. The standard defines a human-readable language
that is flexible enough to let anyone define their own document structures
using what is called elements and attributes. Both will be explained shortly.
Although flexible in some regards, the standard is quite strict in other areas
[14]. For instance the grammar, which defines element and attribute place-
ment, legal names, and more, is very detailed. A document that adheres to
this grammar is called well-formed.
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2.1.1 Elements
The main building-block of an XML document is the element. An element is
a container that can have a value and zero or more attributes. Also, an ele-
ment may contain other elements. An element consists of two corresponding
start and stop definitions. An example is displayed below. The start and
stop elements are on lines 1 and 3, respectively.
1 <exampleElement>
2 element value
3 </exampleElement>
2.1.2 Attributes
In addition to using elements, one can also use attributes to contain infor-
mation in an XML document. The main difference from an element is that
an attribute can only have a value and cannot contain other attributes or
elements. An attribute is always contained inside an element. Extending
the previous example, we get the following:
<exampleElement anAttribute="attribute value">
element value
</exampleElement>
A simple example of an XML document with both elements and at-
tributes is shown below:
1 <?xml version="1.0"?>
2 <person sex="male">
3 <firstName>Peter</firstName>
4 <lastName>Pan</lastName>
5 <birthYear>1970</birthYear>
6 </person>
The first line defines that the document is XML version 1.0. Next, a
person element is defined beginning on line 2 and ending on line 6. The
person element has an attribute called “sex” with the value “male” Inside
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the element we also find three other elements (“firstName”, “lastName”,
“birthYear”), each with individual values.
2.1.3 Namespaces
According to Harold & Means, namespaces have two purposes in XML [14]:
• To be able to distinguish elements or attributes from different vocab-
ularies that happen to have identical names.
• To group related elements and attributes.
Elements and attributes from different namespaces can appear in the
same document. This may happen if a document from one namespace is
nested inside a document from another namespace. A namespace is simply
a prefix prepended to element and attribute names, with a colon separating
the two. A namespace is often formed as a URI1, and as it can be rather long,
it is possible to define a shorthand version of it inside the XML document.
If the namespace for the previous example was “http://www.example.org”,
and “ex” is used as the shorthand version, the document would be:
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<ex:person ex:sex="male" xmlns:ex="http://www.example.org">
<ex:firstName>Peter</ex:firstName>
<ex:lastName>Pan</ex:lastName>
<ex:birthYear>1970</ex:birthYear>
</ex:person>
2.1.4 XML Schema
In order to restrict what information an XML document can contain, it is
possible to create an XML Schema[16] for it. A schema can be used to spec-
ify what elements and attributes a document can contain, the relationships
between them, and what values they can take.
1A URI is a string that identifies a web resource. URIs are defined as a superset of
URLs [15].
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A schema for the previous XML document can be:
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<xs:schema
xmlns:xs="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"
targetNamespace="http://www.example.org">
<xs:element name="person">
<xs:complexType>
<xs:sequence>
<xs:element name="firstName" type="xs:string" />
<xs:element name="lastName" type="xs:string" />
<xs:element name="birthYear" type="xs:integer" />
</xs:sequence>
<xs:attribute name="sex" type="xs:string" />
</xs:complexType>
</xs:element>
</xs:schema>
In the definition above, a complex type is defined inside the person el-
ement. When an element has attributes and nested elements, these must
be specified within a complex type. The nested elements are defined as a
sequence, which means that the elements in an XML document that adheres
to the schema must appear in the specified order. “birthYear” is defined as
an integer, while “firstName”, “lastName”, and “sex” are defined as strings.
The namespace that the schema defines is specified in the “targetNames-
pace” attribute.
The schema could be made more sophisticated, e.g. by adding a restric-
tion on the values for sex (“male” or “female”), or specifying that a year of
birth must be 1900 or later. The main use of XML schemas is to validate
XML documents. A document that adheres to the XML grammar as well
its associated XML schema is said to be both well-formed and valid.
2.1.5 XPath
In addition to validating XML documents, it is also important to be able to
query XML documents in order to retrieve information that fulfills certain
criteria. The XML Path Language (XPath) [17] is a language developed
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for this purpose. Using what is called XPath expressions one can select a
particular subset of the elements and attributes of an XML document [18,
p122].
2.2 Web Services
A great part of our practical work with this thesis has been associated with
web services. Web services are designed to support system interoperability
by allowing server-to-server communication over a network. Web services
are often associated with protocols such as SOAP, WSDL, and UDDI. These
protocols will be further introduced and a general definition of web services
will be provided in this section.
2.2.1 Web Services Definition
Cerami [19, p3] defines web services to be any service that is available over
the Internet, uses a standardized XML messaging system, and is not tied to
any one operating system or programming language. Additionally, even
though it is not required, web services should be discoverable and self-
describing. When these criteria are fulfilled, the web service can add value
to other developers, because they become able to discover the service and
invoke it from their applications.
2.2.2 Web Services Architecture
The web services architecture can be considered from two different points
of view. Both alternatives are described here.
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Alternative 1: Description by Role Model
The first alternative for describing the web services architecture is describing
different roles in the architecture. Web services include three communicating
parts, and each of these parts has its own role. The three roles are:
• The Client. The client is the machine which invokes and consumes
the web service.
• The Registry. In order to use a web service, the client does a lookup
in the registry to find the desired service. The registry holds references
to web services implemented by different service providers and returns
web service addresses to the clients.
• The Service. The service is the web service itself. The web service
responds to client requests and contains the web service logic.
Figure 2.1 shows a schematic depiction of these roles and how they are
related.
Alternative 2: Description by Protocol Stack
When the three web services roles are to be implemented, three systems
have to communicate using the same protocol stack. The second alternative
for describing the web services architecture is outlining the protocol stack.
The stack is depicted in figure 2.2.
Figure 2.1: Web Service Roles
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Different references describe different protocol stacks with different level
of detail. The stack presented in figure 2.2 is extracted from [20] and [21].
This protocol stack provides a sufficient level of detail for illustrating the
web services architecture in this section.
Web services run on the OSI application layer. Therefore, all layers of
the web services protocol stack are situated on the OSI application layer.
The layers are:
• The Service Transport Layer. Situated at the bottom of the web
services protocol stack is the service transport layer. This layer’s main
task is transporting messages between applications. Traditional proto-
cols such as HTTP over TCP or UDP are common choices on this layer,
but, in principle, a number of other protocols can be used (e.g. FTP
and SMTP). HTTP, TCP, and UDP will not be further described. For
more details on these protocols, Tanenbaum [22] is an excellent source.
• The Messaging Layer. This layer handles XML parsing and encod-
ing. The XML formats play a major role when web services are used for
achieving interoperability between heterogeneous end-systems. SOAP
is the most common protocol choice on this layer, and will be further
examined in section 2.3.
• The Discovery and Description Layer. This layer exists side by
side with the Security layer. The discovery part of this layer imple-
ments the lookup functionality of the registry role described above.
The UDDI protocol is the natural choice for this functionality. The
description protocol defines the interface to the web service, and the
WSDL protocol is typically used for this purpose. Both the UDDI and
WSDL protocols will be further described in coming sections.
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• The Security Layer. The security layer exists side by side with the
discovery and description layer. This layer adds security services such
as authentication and confidentiality to the messages.
• The Application Layer. The top layer of the web services stack
consists of the applications that use web services.
Figure 2.2: Web Service Protocol Stack
Throughout this chapter, the different protocols used in our work are
further described.
2.3 XML Messaging Using SOAP
The SOAP protocol is developed for passing XML messages between com-
puters. The web services architecture strongly depends on XML messaging.
SOAP and web services are thus tightly interconnected.
SOAP is mainly developed for remote procedure calls over HTTP. The
SOAP functionality may look like the functionality of middleware frame-
works such as CORBA. Unlike similar frameworks, SOAP uses plain XML
for all messages and is therefore language and operating system independent.
This independence makes SOAP excellent for system integration processes.
SOAP is a natural choice for XML messaging when e.g. a java platform
system is to be integrated with a system developed on the .NET platform.
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A sketch of the SOAP message format is shown in figure 2.3. The SOAP
message must always include a SOAP envelope, inside which all data is
placed. Inside the envelope, a body element is required. Additionally, header
and fault elements can be optionally included in the envelope.
For further details and practical examples on the SOAP message format,
the reader is referred to appendix A.
Figure 2.3: SOAP Message Format
2.4 Describing Web Services with WSDL
The Web Services Description Language (WSDL) is an XML standard that
describes web services. WSDL describes the operations and messages used
for a web service. A WSDL document thus represents the interface for a
given web service and leaves the implementation of the web service to the
developer. WSDL is language and platform independent and is commonly
used for describing SOAP services.
The WSDL standard includes definitions of several elements, including
the definitions element, the types element, the message element, the port-
type element, the binding element, and the service element.
Our work does not deal with details of the WSDL document. Readers
can get more details about the WSDL document in appendix A.
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2.5 Describing, Discovering and Integrating Web
Services
The Universal Description, Discovery and Integration (UDDI) technical
specification provides a standard method for giving publicity to and dis-
covering of web services. However, UDDI is not included in our work, and
is just mentioned here because of its tight connections with web services.
Some details of UDDI are found in appendix A
2.6 Summary
This chapter introduced the basic building blocks for the work presented by
this thesis. The protocols and standards presented here will be referred to
in the following chapters.
XML is a standard that defines a human-readable language that lets
anyone define their own document structure using elements and attributes.
XML documents can be validated against an XML Schema, which is used
to specify what elements and attributes a document can contain. XPath is
a language for querying an XML document.
Web services provide a standard means for server-to-server communica-
tion over a network. Protocols such as SOAP, WSDL and UDDI are often
associated with web services. All of these protocols were briefly presented
in this chapter.
The next chapter introduces several security aspects related to web ser-
vices, and is the second of three background chapters.
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Chapter 3
Securing Web Services
When developing a security solution, it is important to keep in mind that
a chain is only as strong as the weakest link. Although our goal is to add
input validation to web services, we want to examine the existing security
mechanisms for web services, for instance those providing confidentiality and
authenticity. An important reason for this is that we want to understand
the whole web services security picture. This understanding may prove
beneficial when we start developing our system in part II.
Web services may expose business critical systems and information, and
it is crucial that a proper level of protection is applied. Security was not
addressed in early web services standards, but has been gradually added
later on, through a plethora of standards.
This chapter consists of three parts. In the first, transport-level and
messaging-level security is discussed. Then, the core XML and web services
security standards are examined. In the last part, web services security
policy standards and specifications are examined.
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3.1 The Case for Messaging Layer Security
Web services security can be applied both on the transport layer and on the
messaging layer. Both methods have benefits and drawbacks. In general,
transport layer security is faster and less flexible, whereas messaging layer
security is slower and more flexible. The two methods are sometimes used in
conjunction for added security when particularly sensitive data is processed
and transferred.
3.1.1 Transport Layer Security Insufficiencies
A very common way of securing application data is by using the Transport
Layer Security (TLS) protocol [23]. TLS can provide data confidentiality and
integrity by means of encryption and hash algorithms. Additionally, by using
both client and server authentication (e.g. using digital certificates), the
peers can authenticate each other. TLS provides point-to-point protection
between two hosts, as illustrated in figure 3.1. Communication is secured
between Host A and Host B, and between Host B and Host C.
While ideal for certain web service security scenarios, the protocol is
insufficient in more complex environments [24]. We now look at two cases
where TLS is insufficient for protecting Web Services.
Figure 3.1: Security Applied Using TLS
Case 1 - Intermediary Web Services and Application Firewalls
A common web service scenario involves intermediaries that have to be able
to access parts of a message. Application firewalls may need access to the
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message to decide whether to allow it to pass or not, and intermediary web
services may need to process parts of the message. In this case, TLS does not
provide enough flexibility as it only provides end-to-end and all-or-nothing
protection when TLS is used between the endpoints.
Case 2 - Post-Transit Protection
Also, with transport-level security protocols such as TLS, communication is
secured when in transit only. Often it is desirable to protect data in sub-
sequent storage, for instance when persisted in a database. An illustration
is shown in figure 3.2, where the data sent from Host A to Host B is only
protected between the two hosts, and not if Host B decides to save it in a
database.
Figure 3.2: TLS Only Offers Data Protection During Transit
3.1.2 Messaging Layer Security
It will now be illustrated how protection can be applied to the two cases by
applying security on the messaging level.
Case 1 - Intermediary Web Services and Application Firewalls
One of the main benefits of applying security on the messaging level is the
flexibility this gives. For instance, security can be applied to selected parts
of messages, making it possible for intermediate web services or application
firewalls to access parts of it. Please see figure 3.3 for an illustration.
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Figure 3.3: Messaging Layer Security Allows Flexibility of Message Protec-
tion
Case 2 - Post-Transit Protection
Additionally, when security is applied to messages this means that the mes-
sages easily can be stored in a protected state. This principle is shown in
figure 3.4.
Figure 3.4: Messaging Layer Security Offers Data Protection Also After
Transit
3.2 Core Security Standards
Whereas TLS was used to secure the transport layer, a set of security stan-
dards is used to apply security on the messaging layer. Next, the foundations
of web services security will be presented. First, XML Encryption and XML
Signature are discussed. Then, WS-Security, which extends the two XML
standards, is examined.
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3.2.1 XML Security Standards
The World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) defined two standards for XML
security which are employed by web service security standards; XML en-
cryption and XML signature. As the names imply, these standards define
methods for encryption and signing of XML documents. The standards can
be combined and applied with a high degree of flexibility, and one can, for
instance, sign or encrypt only certain parts of an XML document.
XML Encryption
The XML Encryption standard [25] specifies how to encrypt arbitrary parts
of XML documents using well-known encryption algorithms such as triple
DES [26] and AES [27]. The standard also defines methods for key agreement
and key exchange. The operation of XML Encryption is shown in Appendix
B.1.
XML Signature
Complementing the encryption standard, the XML Signature standard [28]
specifies how to ensure integrity and authenticity of XML messages using
standards such as SHA-1 [29] and HMAC [30]. Sender authenticity is en-
sured using digital signatures (RSA [31] or DSS [32]). The operation of
XML Signature is shown in Appendix B.2.
3.2.2 WS-Security
A central standard for web services security is WS-Security. It was originally
developed by Microsoft, Verisign, and IBM, and was published in April 2002
[33]. It was later submitted to the Organization for the Advancement of
Structured Information Standards (OASIS), which continues to work on the
standard. OASIS released version 1.0 in April 2004, and version 1.1 was
approved in February 2006.
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Microsoft, IBM and other cooperating organizations have later devel-
oped a set of security specifications building on WS-Security. Among these
are WS-Policy and WS-SecurityPolicy, which will be covered later in the
chapter. Many of these specifications have been submitted to OASIS for
standardization.
The standard specifies XML document details, and leaves most infor-
mation related to implementation (such as algorithms used) up to the im-
plementors. As Bhargavan et. al. point out, it “focuses on interoperability
details rather than security” [34].
Basically, WS-Security is an extension of SOAP, adding support for au-
thentication, integrity and confidentiality to SOAP messages. Confidential-
ity and integrity are achieved using the aforementioned XML Encryption
and XML signatures, respectively. WS-Security also specifies how to con-
vey authentication information in an XML message using what is called a
security token.
According to the WS-Security standard [35], a security token is a col-
lection of claims, which are declarations made by an entity regarding name,
identity, etc. A signed security token is a security token that has been
cryptographically signed by an authority. A security token may contain au-
thentication information, but may also be used for authorization details, for
instance.
When it comes to authentication, there exist specifications of several
kinds of security tokens, some which can be found in additional profiles.
There is support for user name/password, X.509 certificates, and Kerberos
authentication, but the model is generic and extensible and allows for other
authentication mechanisms as well.
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3.3 Security Policy
The security policy is a very important part of the security of any informa-
tion system. The SANS Institute defines a security policy as [36]:
A set of rules and practices that specify or regulate how a system
or organization provides security services to protect sensitive and
critical system resources.
In a web services context, a security policy may define who can access the
web service and how information is protected to and from the web service.
Building on WS-Security, several web services security policy specifications
and standards have been developed. These allow web service developers to
formalize and communicate the web service policy. The mechanisms also
let clients discover web service policy requirements and to make decisions
on which services to use and how to use them, based on their associated
security policies. A generic model can be seen in figure 3.5 (adapted from
[37, p131]).
Figure 3.5: A Generic Security Policy Model
3.3.1 WS-Policy
WS-Policy was developed by a group of companies including Microsoft, IBM,
and VeriSign, and specifies a generic model for describing web services se-
curity policies [38]. It defines a policy as a set of alternatives, and a client
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has to satisfy one of these alternatives. Each alternative in turn consists of
a set of assertions that specify requirements that the client has to meet. An
illustration of this model is shown in figure 3.6.
Figure 3.6: Policy as Defined by WS-Policy
3.3.2 WS-SecurityPolicy
Work on WS-SecurityPolicy was initiated by VeriSign, IBM, Microsoft, and
RSA Security [39]. It was later handed over to OASIS, and as of February
2006 it has status as a working draft1.
WS-Policy specifies a policy structure. However, it does not define any
particular types of assertions, and leaves this for other specifications. WS-
SecurityPolicy is such a specification, and extends WS-Policy by defining a
set of security-related assertions. Hence, WS-Policy and WS-SecurityPolicy
jointly constitute a framework for creating web services security policies.
The assertions specified by WS-SecurityPolicy can be grouped into two
groups:
• Protection Assertions (signing, encryption, required elements)
• Token Assertions (username, X.509, Kerberos, etc.)
The protection assertions state requirements for which parts of the SOAP
messages that must be signed, encrypted, and present. Token assertions are
used to specify authentication information.
1As the OASIS version of WS-SecurityPolicy is still on the draft stage, this paper is
based on the v1.1 specification by IBM, Microsoft, RSA Security, and VeriSign.
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In addition to specifying security assertions, WS-SecurityPolicy also de-
velops WS-Policy further and adds some flexibility regarding nesting of poli-
cies and assertions.
3.4 Summary
This chapter, the second of three background chapters, introduced web ser-
vices security aspects. First, it was discussed why it is sometimes desirable
to apply security on the messaging layer, instead or in addition to security
on the transport layer. Then, three fundamental XML and web services
security standards - XML Encryption, XML Signature, and WS-Security -
were introduced. Last, the thesis discussed security policies in a web services
context, and presented the WS-Policy and WS-SecurityPolicy standards.
In the following chapter, we focus on a central topic for this thesis,
namely input validation. Different approaches and concepts are introduced,
and the chapter concludes the background part.
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Chapter 4
Input Validation
Accepting unvalidated input from the user is considered the greatest threat
of a web application by several influential organizations and scientists [2, 40].
By validating input data, one wants to prevent unexpected input data from
harming the web service application execution.
Although web services differ from regular web applications in many ways,
input validation is similar for both. While traditional web application input
is input from users who download a form and post it back to the server, web
services receive input from applications. In other words, web applications
receive input from users, while web services receive input from machines.
In practice, this difference does not change the need for input validation,
as there is no difference between input from machines and input from users.
Malicious applications exist as well as malicious users. Thus, one cannot
trust web service input more than web application input.
Before defining the requirements for the input validator solution in the
next chapter, a brief introduction to key input validation concepts is pro-
vided in this chapter.
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4.1 Web Service Input
Input to web services can be divided into two categories. The first category
is what is usually meant by input, namely input parameters received through
the web service interface.
The second category is input from subsystems. Web service applications
often communicate with subsystems and receive input from these systems.
An example of such subsystems can be a database. To ensure that all
input data is valid, web services should also validate database input. This
validation can be challenging, especially when several applications write to
the same database.
4.2 Defining Valid Data
When designing a validation scheme, one should begin with defining what
should be accepted as valid data. As is to be seen in this section, this should
be done carefully. This section will describe two approaches to defining valid
data called “blacklisting” and “whitelisting”.
Alternative One: Blacklisting
The first, and probably most intuitive, approach to the challenge of defining
valid data is called blacklisting. Blacklisting is based on maintaining a list of
invalid data and compare input data against this list. If input data matches
an item in the blacklist, it is considered as invalid.
If one forgets adding an invalid item to the list, the validation will be
less strict than intended because invalid data will pass as valid.
Alternative Two: Whitelisting
The second approach is called whitelisting, and is the opposite of blacklist-
ing. Instead of maintaining a list of invalid data, this approach maintains a
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list of valid data. When validating against such a whitelist one defines all
input data which matches an entry in the whitelist as valid.
If one forgets to list an item in the whitelist, the validation will be
stricter than intended. Valid data which should have been on the list, but
is forgotten, will not pass the validator. This property makes whitelisting
more suitable to human developers than blacklisting. Humans will sooner
or later forget listing something. Thus, it is often desirable to use whitelist-
ing because the consequences of forgetting are often less serious with this
approach.
4.3 Validation in Code Versus Validation Out of
Code
The web service developer is faced with a design choice when deciding on
where to put the validation logic. The first alternative is writing validation
code inside each method that accepts input. Given that the programmer is
able and willing to handle validation when programming, doing validation in
code is a solution to the input validation challenge. However, maintenance
of validation code becomes more challenging.
The second alternative for validating input is building an automatic vali-
dation framework. The framework should handle all input to the web appli-
cation and hide all validation-specific programming from the programmer.
By using such a framework, validation is moved out of the application.
Huseby [40] lists several benefits from moving the validation out of the
application:
• The application code becomes “cleaner” and the programmer does not
need to think of validation when programming.
• The programmer does what he is good at (programming) and leaves
security to the security division.
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• If an automated out-of-code-framework existed, adding input valida-
tion to existing applications becomes easy.
• Maintenance of the blacklist/whitelist is much easier. By centralizing
input validation, the blacklist/whitelist can be put into one single file.
• Using dedicated processing recourses for validation will improve the
application performance.
4.4 Summary
This chapter introduced some key concepts associated with input validation.
Two opposite approaches to validation, called whitelisting and blacklisting,
were presented.
When implementing validation, one should consider where to write val-
idation code. The first alternative is writing validation code directly in the
application code. This might be sufficient for small applications but does
not scale well. The second alternative is making an automated validation
framework which can be configured out of code.
The next chapter is the first chapter describing the system development
part of this master’s thesis work. The chapter specifies system requirements
for the web service input validation system.
Part II
System Development
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Introduction
This part of the thesis provides a detailed description of a web service input
validator. The validator mechanism presented here is developed for use by
system administrators or other security staff, and allows adding input val-
idation to a web service at deployment time. Thus, developers are able to
focus on implementing business logic rather than considering input valida-
tion during programming.
Figure 4.1: System Development Approach
An overview of our system development approach is shown in figure 4.1.
As indicated in the figure, each of the following four chapters maps to one
of the four steps.
33
Before delving into the solution’s requirements, it may be helpful to
clarify the context in which our solution will operate. Figure 4.2 shows
a principle drawing of a web service and two web service clients accessing
the service using IP and a set of web services-related standards. Note that
our solution will intercept the incoming messages to the web service, and
validate these before letting them through to the web service.
Figure 4.2: Solution Context
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Chapter 5
System Requirements
In this chapter the problem statement is used as a starting point for defin-
ing the system’s functional and non-functional requirements, and for conve-
nience the problem statement from the introduction is repeated:
We want to design and implement an automatic, verifiable, and centralized
mechanism for web services input validation that can be added to and con-
figured for a web service at deployment time.
Properties explicitly mentioned in the problem statement are mapped
into solution requirements. Additionally, we also add non-functional re-
quirements that are considered important for the solution to function satis-
factory.
5.1 Functional Requirements
5.1.1 Requirement 1: Automatic Policy Enforcement
A policy-based approach to specifying web services protection has been cho-
sen mainly because existing web services security standards and specifica-
tions (e.g. WS-SecurityPolicy, see Chapter 3) are policy-based.
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The system will enforce specified input policies for a defined set of web
services and contained operations, called ports. Policy enforcement should
be automatic, and should not depend on manual intervention [6]. This
principle is necessary for the system to be usable in a practical application;
manual enforcement would make the system both prohibitively slow and
increase the risk of errors.
5.1.2 Requirement 2: Verifiable Protection
An important aspect of the system is the ability to verify its operation on
two levels; coverage and correctness.
Requirement 2.1: Coverage
It must be possible to ensure that all web services that the system admin-
istrator intends to protect are in fact protected.
Requirement 2.2: Correctness
Additionally, the system administrator must be able to verify that the spec-
ified policy definitions work as intended.
5.2 Non-functional Requirements
5.2.1 Requirement 3: Maintainability
Requirement 3.1: Separation of Policy Definition and Enforcement
Separation of security policy and enforcement is a generally accepted prin-
ciple [41]. This allows the policy to be modified without having to change
the enforcement mechanism. The solution should therefore separate policy
definition and enforcement.
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Requirement 3.2: Separation of Web Service and Policy Definition
Leaving the definition of security policies as a deployment consideration is
valuable for several reasons. For instance, developers can continue develop-
ing web services as before. Security policies can then be added by others
at deployment time. The input validation solution should therefore support
separation of web service and policy definition.
Requirement 3.3: Centralized Policy Definition
In order to simplify policy updates and facilitate reuse of policy definitions,
a centralization of policy definitions is called for. This way, common policy
definitions can be shared between several web services. As each definition
is defined only once, there is no problem with keeping different definition
instances synchronized.
5.2.2 Requirement 4: Security
Requirement 4.1: Non-Bypassability
For the policy mechanism to be effective, it is important that it cannot be
bypassed. One must endure that every web service request is checked for
policy compliance.
Requirement 4.2: Secure Policy Storage
It is vital that the security policy is protected against tampering. The vali-
dation mechanism will be compromised if an attacker succeeds in modifying
the policy. The policy should be protected against adding of new entries
and modification of existing entries.
Unauthorized reading of the policy file also represents a security threat
and should be denied. The main threat associated with giving attackers
read-access to the policy file is that the attacker becomes able to discover
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configuration weaknesses introduced by system administrators. Thus, the
system would no longer be a black box from the attacker’s point of view.
It must be ensured that the policy itself is stored by a trusted party.
Also, unauthorized replacement of the policy must not be allowed.
Requirement 4.3: Whitelisting
In accordance with the theory on whitelisting and blacklisting, mentioned
in section 4.2, we want our solution to employ the whitelisting technique for
validating input.
Requirement 4.4: Logging
The solution must be able to log important events, such as program errors
and security incidents, to persistent storage.
For the log to be used for non-repudiation purposes, it must be tamper-
proof.
5.2.3 Requirement 5: Platform Independence
The solution must be platform independent in order to support heteroge-
neous server environments. It is not uncommon that enterprises maintain
code written years ago [42]. As time goes by, new platforms emerge. Thus,
due to different time of development, the applications are most probably
developed for, and deployed on, different platforms. Companies tend to
be reluctant to rewriting old code because they already have a working,
debugged solution. Platform independent solutions are therefore valuable.
Web services are widely used for integrating new and existing systems.
By using the XML message format and standardized protocols, web services
are designed to be platform independent. Accordingly, the same should
apply for the input validation mechanism.
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5.2.4 Requirement 6: Modularity and Encapsulation
Encapsulation on the object-level is a combination of two aspects: grouping
of object state and operations, and limiting access to an object’s data only
through its interface [43]. In addition to using object-level encapsulation,
we also want grouping (also called modularity) and encapsulation on the
the module-level in our solution. In general, encapsulation and modularity
make both development and testing easier.
5.2.5 Requirement 7: Flexibility and Extensibility
The system must be flexible enough to allow for a wide range of different
policy definitions. Furthermore, it is important that the system can be
extended when needed. This property goes hand-in-hand with modularity
and encapsulation, as they make it easier to replace and add functionality
by replacing or adding modules.
5.2.6 Requirement 8: Reusability
Requirement 8.1: Existing Standards and Specifications
When possible, the solution should use existing standards and interfaces.
This requirement is tightly connected to compatibility and platform indepen-
dence, but some additional remarks should be made. Reuse reduces devel-
opment costs by avoiding rethinking and reimplementing others’ thoughts.
Furthermore, support from existing development environments and tools
saves time and money.
Training costs will also be reduced when existing standards, protocols,
and interfaces are used. If developers have experience with the standards,
the threshold for making use of the solution should be low.
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Developers should also be able to verify that the given security solution
provides the intended security. Verification of the solution becomes easier
when well-known and trusted standards are used.
Requirement 8.2: Existing Functionality
In addition to reusing existing standards and specifications, the solution
should reuse existing implementations whenever possible. This is particu-
larly important in the case of validation functionality, in which a program-
ming error could severely threaten the security of the entire solution.
Although not typically non-functional, this requirement is listed here
because it is closely related to the non-functional reusability requirement.
5.2.7 Requirement 9: Performance
The verbose XML format generates overhead compared to more compressed
formats (e.g. binary encoded data). There is no doubt that other middle-
ware platforms outperform web services when it comes to performance. Sim-
ulations have found that the XML based SOAP protocol used for web ser-
vices performs seven times poorer than the CORBA platform [44]. The sim-
ulations state that delay associated with SOAP stems mainly from parsers
and the implementation of the communication handlers.
In order to avoid adding significant delays to the web service, all com-
munication messages for the input validation solution should run internally
on the server.
5.3 Summary
In this chapter, the problem statement was used as a basis for defining the
system’s requirements.
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The functional requirements say that the system should protect web
services using automatic and verifiable policy enforcement. Additionally,
the non-functional requirements tell us that the system should be easily
maintained, secure, platform independent, flexible, extensible, and modu-
lar. Also, it was stated that existing functionality should be reused when
possible, and that performance - although not our prime concern - should
not be prohibitively poor.
The stated requirements will serve as the basis from which decisions are
made in the next chapter’s analysis.
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Chapter 6
System Analysis
In this chapter we analyze the requirements that were listed in chapter
5, and outline a solution that satisfies them. In order to check that all
system requirements are satisfied, a system requirements traceability matrix
is developed. The blank matrix is shown in table 6, and the completed
matrix is provided in the last section of the chapter.
The solution architecture is developed step-by-step throughout this chap-
ter. The architecture will then be used for creating the implementation-
specific design in the next chapter.
6.1 The Initial System
We start the analysis by showing an illustration of the system to which we
intend to add our solution. For a summary of the solution context, the
reader is referred to the introduction of the system development process on
page 33.
Figure 6.1 shows a set of web services, each with web service ports,
situated on a given web server. When a web service request arrives on the
web server, it is forwarded to the correct web service and port.
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Req 1.0: Automatic Policy Enforcement
Req 2.1: Coverage
Req 2.2: Correctness
Req 3.1: Sep. of Policy Def. and Enforcement
Req 3.2: Sep. of Web Service and Policy Def.
Req 3.3: Centralized Policy Def.
Req 4.1: Non-Bypassability
Req 4.2: Secure Policy Storage
Req 4.3: Whitelisting
Req 4.4: Logging
Req 5.0: Platform Independence
Req 6.0: Modularity and Encapsulation
Req 7.0: Flexibility and Extensibility
Req 8.1: Existing Standards and Specs.
Req 8.2: Existing Functionality
Req 9.0: Performance
Table 6.1: Blank Requirements Traceability Matrix
Figure 6.1: Initial System Architecture
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Our goal is to add a mechanism that validates that the values of the
parameters within each web service request are in accordance with a specified
security policy.
The first step is to separate web services, policy, and policy enforcement,
described in section 6.2. The high-level model described in 6.2 is further
extended for allowing reusability in 6.3. Section 6.4 explains the solution
more in depth by dividing each of the components into subcomponents.
In 6.5 we introduce logging and security to the system. In section 6.6, the
remaining components, called correctness and coverage, are described. After
each of the above-mentioned steps, a depiction of the solution at that point
is provided.
6.2 Step 1: Separating Web Services, Policy, and
Policy Enforcement
The requirements section dictates separation of the web service from the
policy and policy enforcement. In order to fulfill this requirement, we want to
divide the system into three parts. The first part contains the web services,
the second holds the policy, and the third enforces the policy. These parts
will be further explained below. The result of this step is depicted in figure
6.2.
6.2.1 Web Services
This part of the system contains the web services that will be protected.
Each web service contains one or more ports. The web service ports repre-
sent the publicly available web service methods, where anyone in possession
of the web service address is able to inject data. The web service name must
be unique, and within each web service all port names must be unique. All
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Figure 6.2: System Architecture After Step 1
input to the web service ports should be validated against the policy defini-
tions held by the policy component described below.
6.2.2 The Policy Component
The policy component holds a repository of the policy definitions. For now
we do not care about secure storage of the repository. The policy component
must have the ability to browse through the content of the repository. Fur-
ther, it must accept incoming policy definition requests and respond with
the requested policy. It is important that only authorized requests - those
made by the policy enforcement component - must be accepted. A typical
request will ask for the policy definition belonging to a given web service
and port. The policy component must therefore accept web service name
and port name as input parameters. Upon receiving input, the component
must look up the policy definition matching these parameters and return it
to the sender.
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6.2.3 The Policy Enforcement Component
The policy enforcement component performs the validation and is therefore
considered the main component in this project. According to the require-
ments, policy enforcement should be executed automatically. Thus, the
policy enforcement component should not require human decisions or user
interactions when deciding whether input is valid or not.
Another important requirement associated with the enforcement compo-
nent is non-bypassability. In order to meet this requirement, the component
must intercept and validate every incoming web service request before it is
handed over to the web service.
Each incoming request has the name of the web service and port name
embedded in the request. For each incoming request, the policy enforcement
component must send a request to the policy component in order to get the
correct policy definition. After receiving the policy definition from the policy
component, the policy enforcement component validates the incoming data.
If validation succeeds, the incoming web service request should be handed
over to the correct web service. Otherwise, the request should be rejected.
For security reasons we do not want to provide the message sender with more
details than necessary, so the policy enforcement component only replies
with a message stating that validation failed.
6.3 Step 2: Reuse
Reuse of existing standards, specifications, and functionality was emphasized
in the requirements. The proposed solution will incorporate reuse in several
ways; this is further described in the sections below. The system architecture
after adding reuse functionality is shown in figure 6.3.
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Figure 6.3: System Architecture After Step 2
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6.3.1 Using XML Schema for Validation
In our solution, an XML Schema, introduced in section 2.1.4, is used for
validation of incoming web service requests. In addition to the benefits of
reusing an existing standard (for details, please refer to section 5.2.6), this
means that existing XML validation functionality can be employed.
6.3.2 Policy Definition Reuse
The second level on which we want to enable reuse is by creating a repository
of policy definitions that can be shared by several web services. This way,
already-existing, mature, and well-tested definitions can easily be reused by
new web services.
6.3.3 Policy Definition Flexibility
As mentioned above, we validate input against XML schemas. The require-
ments dictate that existing functionality should be reused. Our solution
should make use of the fact that WSDL documents can contain important
validation information in XML Schema format. Most web services have a
WSDL document associated with them and, thus, making use of the WSDL
document XML schemas can be a time-saving factor for developers. It
should not be necessary to rewrite the XML Schema in the policy compo-
nent’s repository if a proper schema already exists in the WSDL document.
Before describing the XML schema reuse logic, we discuss the need for the
possibility to retrieve XML schemas from both WSDL documents and the
repository.
Why not Use Only WSDL?
It might seem like retrieving the XML Schema from the WSDL document
would be sufficient, and that the repository therefore is unnecessary. We
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want to emphasize that retrieving the XML schema from a repository is
needed in several cases and for several reasons:
• Not all web services have associated WSDL documents. One reason is
that not all enterprises publish their WSDL documents due to fear of
exposing infrastructure.
• Basing a solution on WSDL definitions alone would result in limited
flexibility because policy reuse becomes difficult.
• WSDL definitions are tied up to the WSDL standard. It would there-
fore be challenging to extend the policy definitions.
Due to the above-mentioned reasons, we have chosen to retrieve XML
schemas from both the repository and the WSDL document. Thus, the pol-
icy component is extended with functionality that makes validation against
the WSDL XML schema possible.
WSDL XML Schema Reuse Logic
The logic behind allowing existing WSDL XML Schema definitions to be
reused is illustrated in figure 6.4. Note that the web service request heading
for a given port is intercepted by the policy enforcement module. Then, both
WSDL and repository schema definitions for this port are retrieved from the
policy component. Next, all input parameters for this port are validated
against either the WSDL or the repository schema. To allow for maximum
flexibility, the solution should allow some parameters to have WSDL vali-
dation, whereas the rest are validated against the repository schema. If all
input parameters are valid, the web service request is forwarded. If not, the
request is rejected.
As stated in the requirements, the solution should be composed of encap-
sulated modules and be extensible. Extending the policy component should
Step 2: Reuse 51
Figure 6.4: Sequence Diagram Illustrating the Flexibility of Reusing Existing
WSDL Schema Definitions
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therefore be easy. If, for any reason, future use of the system should require
getting the XML schema from other locations than yet supported, it should
be convenient to add such extensions.
6.4 Step 3: Modularity
In this step, the modularity requirements are taken into account. An illus-
tration of the result can be seen in figure 6.5.
Figure 6.5: System Architecture After Step 3
6.4.1 Modularization of the Policy Component
In order to meet the requirements regarding encapsulation and modulariza-
tion of the system, we split the policy component into several subcompo-
nents. During the discussion in this chapter it has become clear that the
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policy component must support retrieving data from a repository as well as
the WSDL document that is associated with a given web service. In the
previous section, we added a subcomponent for handling each of these ways
to retrieve an XML schema.
Now, we add two more subcomponents in the policy component in or-
der to make reuse of policy definitions possible. The two components are
described below.
Policy Mapping Component
The first subcomponent is called the policy mapping component and should
handle the mapping between web services, ports and policy. The policy
enforcement component will request this subcomponent for the policy to use
for the incoming web service request. Thus, the policy mapping component
takes care of the look-up functionality described in section 6.2.2.
Schema Provider Component
The second subcomponent which is added to the policy component is called
the schema provider. Providing the enforcement component with the correct
XML schemas will be the main purpose of this subcomponent. For each
port’s input parameters, the policy enforcement component must request
the XML schema provider for a schema. Upon requests, the XML schema
provider must look up the XML Schema in either the WSDL document or
the repository.
6.4.2 Modularization of the Policy Enforcement Component
To satisfy the requirements, the policy enforcement component should also
be modularized. The component has two main purposes. First, it should
intercept all incoming web service requests. Second, it should do the vali-
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dation of the input parameters. We therefore split its functionality into two
separate subcomponents.
The first subcomponent is the message interceptor. One must ensure that
every incoming web service request is intercepted by the message interceptor.
There should be no way to request the web service without going through
the message interceptor. It is thus clear that this component handles the
non-bypassability requirement.
The second component represents the main logic in the system and is
called the validator. The validator component interacts with almost every
other component in the system and decides on whether the incoming input
is valid or not.
We now draw the whole picture of the validation process from the val-
idator’s point of view. The following steps are included:
1. The validator receives the incoming web service request from the mes-
sage interceptor and reads through the request in order to find the web
service name and port name to which the request is addressed.
2. The validator then requests the policy mapping policy component for
the proper policy to use for this request.
3. When the validator receives the policy mapping, it requests the XML
Schema provider for the correct XML Schema to use for each input
parameter in the request.
4. The validator then validates each input parameter against the received
schema.
5. At last, the validator decides on whether the input is valid or not.
Every input parameter must be valid if the input should be considered
valid.
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6. When input is valid it should be forwarded to the web service, else
it is rejected and should under no circumstances be forwarded. Upon
rejection, a simple message stating that validation failed is returned
to the sender.
An illustration of the process was shown in figure 6.4.
6.5 Step 4: Security
In this step, we specify how to secure the policy definitions and how to
ensure that exceptions are logged. The solution after this step is depicted
in figure 6.6.
6.5.1 Secure Policy Against Tampering
As stated in the requirements, it is vital that the policy cannot be changed
or read by unauthorized users. On the server, this can be achieved by
employing operating system security in such a way that only authorized
users are allowed to read, edit, remove, or replace the policy. In addition to
protecting the file locally on the server, it is also necessary that there exists
no other mechanism for unauthorized users to view or modify the file (e.g.
through the web server).
6.5.2 Logging
In order to fulfill the logging requirement, the solution will contain a cen-
tralized logging component whose responsibility is to log important events
to persistent storage. It is desirable to reuse an existing and stable logging
mechanism, but the exact choice will depend on several implementation de-
cisions made in the next chapter.
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Figure 6.6: System Architecture After Step 4
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6.6 Step 5: Verifiable Operation
One of the functional requirements is that the system is verifiable with
respect to coverage and correctness. The solution with the verifier added is
shown in figure 6.7. The functionality of the verifier will now be discussed.
Figure 6.7: System Architecture After Step 5
6.6.1 Coverage
To satisfy the coverage requirement, the solution must let the system admin-
istrator verify that input validation applies for all the web services, ports,
and parameters for which protection is wanted. This can be done by list-
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ing the relevant contents of the input validation security policy in an easily
readable format where any unprotected items are clearly highlighted.
6.6.2 Correctness
As specified in the requirements, it should be possible to verify that the
input validation is performed as expected. This will be done by allowing the
system administrator to specify a set of valid and invalid input for each web
service port. To check for correctness, a verifying component will execute
the set of input and make sure that the valid input is considered valid and
invalid input considered invalid by the validator.
6.7 Requirements Traceability Matrix
In this section we provide a requirements traceability matrix which can be
found in table 6.2. The analysis in this chapter has derived a system archi-
tecture (figure 6.7) consisting of seven main components. The requirements
traceability matrix maps the components into the system requirements. As
can be seen from the matrix, all requirements are satisfied by the system
architecture.
6.8 Summary
The analysis was a gradual process that involved several steps, where the
solution was extended and further specified with each step. The final illus-
tration in figure 6.7 is rather involved, and this complexity is not needed in
most of the coming discussions. We therefore increase the level of abstrac-
tion and show a higher-level illustration of the solution in figure 6.8.
In this chapter, the requirements were analyzed, but as few decisions as
possible where made with regard to implementation details. This was impor-
tant in order to make the solution generic and implementation-independent.
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Req 1.0: Automatic Policy Enforcement X X X X
Req 2.1: Coverage X
Req 2.2: Correctness X
Req 3.1: Sep. of Policy Def. and Enforcement X X X
Req 3.2: Sep. of Web Service and Policy Def. X X
Req 3.3: Centralized Policy Def. X X
Req 4.1: Non-Bypassability X
Req 4.2: Secure Policy Storage X X
Req 4.3: Whitelisting X X
Req 4.4: Logging X
Req 5.0: Platform Independence X X X
Req 6.0: Modularity and Encapsulation X X X X X X X
Req 7.0: Flexibility and Extensibility X
Req 8.1: Existing Standards and Specs. X X X X X
Req 8.2: Existing Functionality X X X X
Req 9.0: Performance X X X X
Table 6.2: Completed Requirements Traceability Matrix
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In the next chapter, we take the results from the analysis one step further
and decide on all the details that are missing in order for the solution to be
implemented later in the thesis.
Figure 6.8: A High-Level System Architecture
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Chapter 7
System Design
In this chapter, we elaborate on the analysis that was performed in the
previous chapter, make the necessary implementation decisions, and present
the complete solution design.
The first section presents our choice of implementation platform. It is
important to note that, in principle, the system can be implemented on all
platforms that support web services. The platform choice presented in the
coming section is therefore a matter of personal preference.
The second part of this chapter presents specific class-level designs for
each of the components introduced in chapter 6. UML class diagrams are
used and a textual explanation to each of the UML diagrams is provided.
7.1 Implementation Platform
Many platforms are available for implementation. So far, we have focused
on developing a platform-independent solution, but the detailed class-level
design must be targeted for a specific platform and programming language.
We decided to implement the system on the Microsoft .NET platform
[45]. There are several benefits from developing web services applications
on this platform, and we justify the choice in the coming section.
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7.1.1 Broad XML Support
Our system is based on extensive use of XML. It is therefore important that
the platform has implemented functionality for consuming and manipulating
XML data. The .NET platform implements this functionality. The following
list shows more specifically the XML functionality provided by .NET and
the classes implementing this functionality.
• Query an XML document by means of XPath expressions.
This property is needed by several components in order to extract
parts of an XML document. .NET provides this functionality in the
XmlDocument and XPathNavigator classes.
• XML Schema Validation. We wanted a platform with XML schema
validation implemented. XmlDocument and XmlSchema implement
this.
• Read and Write XML. In order to read from the XML-based repos-
itory, we need a class that can read XML from file. .NET has this
functionality implemented in the XmlReader class. XML writing func-
tionality is performed by the XmlWriter class.
7.1.2 Broad Web Services Support
The platform must also implement, and have support for, web services and
the continually evolving web services standards. The .NET Framework con-
tains extensive web services support.
7.1.3 Implementation of WS-Security and WS-Policy
.NET provides an implementation of these standards in a package called
web services enhancements (WSE).
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7.1.4 Logging Facilities
The last argument for choosing the .NET platform is its logging facilities.
The framework offers several ways of logging system events, for instance
using the Windows Event Log.
7.2 Detailed Design
Having made the implementational decisions, we now move on to the de-
tailed design of the solution. In the following, the Unified Modeling Lan-
guage (UML) version 2.0 [46] is used to illustrate the design. Fowler’s UML
Distilled [47] has been selected as the main reference for UML notation.
We refer the reader to figures 6.7 and 6.8 (pages 57 and 60) in the
previous chapter for illustrations of the system architecture which will now
be examined closely.
First, we focus on the policy component and decide what classes and
relations that are needed for implementation. Next, we design the main
part of the system, the policy enforcement component. This component
frequently uses the policy component during message validation. After the
main functionality has been described, we discuss the log component, and
finally we examine the verification component.
7.2.1 The Policy Component
The policy component is designed for handling requests of two types. Firstly,
it responds to requests for policy mappings. Secondly, it responds to requests
for XML schemas, as indicated in figure 6.7. The results derived from this
section are depicted in figure 7.1. All important methods are shown in the
UML diagram.
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Figure 7.1: Detailed Design for the Policy Component
Mapping a given Web Service onto a Given Policy
Each incoming web service request is validated against the policy belonging
to the web service’s policy. The policies are defined on the server side. Thus,
incoming web service requests do not contain information about which policy
they map to.
Since incoming web service requests contain information only about the
web service to which they are destined, we need a mechanism for mapping
the web service to a policy on the server. This mapping function should also
make it possible for several web services to share the same policy.
The class implemented for this purpose is called PolicyMappingManager.
The PolicyMappingManager constructor accepts an XML document holding
the mapping information. Further, the class has one important method
called GetMapping, which takes the web service URI, port number, and
namespace as input. Based on this input, the PolicyMappingManager does
a look-up in order to find the policy associated with the web service. This
lookup is done by using an advanced XPath expression that queries the
mapping document. When the policy root node is found, the document
formed by its subelements is extracted to a policy XML document. The
Detailed Design 65
policy XML document is then returned.
Handling XML Schema Requests
For handling requests for XML schemas we have decided to make use of a
simple interface called ISchemaProvider. ISchemaProvider defines one single
method called GetSchema, which returns an XML schema. The main reason
for implementing this interface is making our solution more flexible with re-
spect to future extensions. If designers of future extensions for instance want
to store XML schemas in a database, this feature can be built into the sys-
tem by having a database handling class that implements ISchemaProvider.
We have two classes implementing this ISchemaProvider in our solution.
These are called RepositorySchemaProvider and WsdlSchemaProvider, and
are discussed next.
Handling XML Schema Requests with Repository
RepositorySchemaProvider assumes that XML schemas are stored in an
XML document. The RepositorySchemaProvider has a constructor that
takes an XML document as input parameter. The constructor input pa-
rameter contains an XML Schema. The only purpose of the Reposito-
rySchemaProvider is to hold the XML document and return the schema
via the GetSchema method.
Handling XML Schema Requests with WSDL document
The second class implemented in our system that implements the interface
is WsdlSchemaProvider. This class is used for extracting XML schemas
from a WSDL document. The constructor of the class takes a path string
as input parameter. Depending on the format of the input path string, the
class retrieves the WSDL schema from file or from the Internet.
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7.2.2 Policy Enforcement Component
The policy enforcement component, also called the “enforcer”, is the main
component of the solution. Its responsibility is to intercept all incoming
SOAP envelopes, and make sure that the envelope’s contents are in accor-
dance with the specified policy, using the Policy Component.
Detailed Design
The enforcer is also the component that interacts with Web Services En-
hancements (WSE) and the .NET web services pipeline. Mainly, WSE is
used for two things:
• To hold the policy mapping definitions and XML Schema definitions
in the WSE policy file
• To pass MessageInterceptor all SOAP envelopes that are received on
the server
The detailed design of the enforcer can be seen in figure 7.2. Only the
important methods and parameters are included. We now go through each
part of the figure and explain how they all fit together.
In WSE, policy assertions are used by applications that want to control
the security-related aspects of the message flow in and out of the web service.
We have created such an assertion, ValidationAssertion, and register it with
WSE.
WSE lets assertions specify their own configuration options in XML-
format in a central security policy file. In this file we have chosen to store
the policy mapping definitions and the XML Schema repository. The Pol-
icyFileHelper class has been created in order to encapsulate the logic of
extracting this information from the policy file.
WSE asks the registered policy assertions for any SOAP filters that the
assertion wants to connect to the web service pipeline, so that it can get
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Figure 7.2: Detailed Design for the Policy Enforcement Component
68 7. System Design
hold of incoming and outgoing web service requests. The proposed solution
includes one such filter, MessageInterceptor, which is configured to intercept
all incoming messages on the web server.
MessageInterceptor delegates the task of validating incoming messages
to a class called Validator. Validator makes use of the Policy Component in
order to achieve this.
Behavior
The behavior of the policy enforcement component can be summarized in
the following steps:
1. Because ValidationAssertion has been registered with WSE, an in-
stance of ValidationAssertion is created automatically when WSE is
initialized.
2. The ReadXml message in ValidationAssertion is called by WSE. A
handler to the WS-Policy configuration file used in WSE is passed to
ValidationAssertion in this method call.
3. Using PolicyFileHelper, ValidationAssertion retrieves the policy map-
ping definition and the XML Schema repository, which are stored in
the configuration file. This information will later be passed to Mes-
sageInterceptor.
4. WSE then calls CreateServiceInputFilter in ValidationAssertion, ask-
ing for an instance of the SoapFilter class. ValidationAssertion then
initializes a MessageInterceptor object with the information from the
previous step.
5. MessageInterceptor creates a Validator and passes it instances of Poli-
cyMappingManager, RepositorySchemaProvider, andWsdlSchemaProvider,
which it also creates.
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Figure 7.3: Sequence Diagram for Validation of a SOAP Envelope, Part I
70 7. System Design
Figure 7.4: Sequence Diagram for Validation of a SOAP Envelope, Part II
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6. The MessageInterceptor instance is returned to WSE
7. When a SOAP envelope is received, it is passed by WSE to the Mes-
sageInterceptor instance for inspection. MessageInterceptor then asks
its Validator instance to validate the message, using the IsValid method
call.
8. The logic that takes place in Validator upon the IsValid method call
is illustrated in the sequence diagram in figures 7.3 and 7.4.
9. If IsValid returns true, MessageInterceptor lets the message pass. If
false is returned, a SOAP fault stating that verification failed is re-
turned to the sender.
7.2.3 Log Component
We have chosen to make use of the Windows Event Log. In order to reuse
as much functionality as possible, we choose to inherit from the EventLog
class which is included in the .NET class library. An illustration of our class,
ValidationLog, and the EventLog class is shown in figure 7.5.
7.2.4 Verification Component
We choose to use the .NET Framework’s web interface component, ASP.NET,
for the user interfaces for the verification component. Figure 7.6 illustrates
the design of the verification component.
Coverage
The Coverage GUI asks the system administrator for the address to the
WSE security policy as well as the name of the name of the section that
contains the input validation policy. Then, it initializes an instance of the
CoverageVerificator class and calls the Verify method. CoverageVerificator
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Figure 7.5: Detailed Design for the Log Component
then analyzes the security policy, looking for unprotected ports and param-
eters, and returns the results to the GUI in the form of an XML document.
Finally, the Coverage GUI displays the results to the system administrator.
Correctness
The Correctness GUI asks the system administrator for the message test
set, the address to the WSE security policy, and the name of the section
that contains the input validation policy. Then, it initializes an instance
of the CorrectnessVerificator class and calls the Verify method. Correct-
nessVerificator then uses the messages specified in the message test set and
asks the Validator to verify each of these. Messages that are specified as
valid in the test set should be verified, and the messages that are defined
as invalid should not. The result of this process is specified in an XML file
and returned to the GUI. Finally, the Correctness GUI displays the results
to the system administrator.
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Figure 7.6: Detailed Design for the Verification Component
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7.2.5 Combining the Components
After having designed all four components, it is now time to combine them
in one diagram. This is done in figure 7.7. In order to keep it simple, only
class names are shown.
7.3 Summary
This chapter completed the design of the input validation system. First,
platform and infrastructure design choices were made. Then, based on these
choices, the detailed design of the components was performed. The next
chapter will describe our implementation of the design presented in this
chapter.
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Figure 7.7: Detailed Design for the Input Validator
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Chapter 8
System Implementation
The design in the previous chapter has been implemented and the imple-
mentation results are presented in this chapter.
The design has resulted in three different tools: the input validator, the
correctness tool, and the coverage tool. In this chapter, all of them are
described and some screenshots are provided.
The main purpose of this chapter is to give the reader an overview of
the different implemented tools before we introduce an example application
in the following chapter.
8.1 The Input Validator
The input validator represents the core of our work. It intercepts web service
input and validates it against a given policy. The input validator consists of
several components. These components were described in detail in chapters
6 and 7.
By adding a reference to the input validator class library, input validation
is effectively added to an application. The input validator has no GUI. It
runs as a background process which listens for incoming web service requests,
validates these requests, and forwards them to the web service if validation
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succeeds. Otherwise, if validation fails, an exception is sent to the calling
application.
8.2 The Correctness Tool
The correctness tool was created to give the system administrator an oppor-
tunity to test if his configurations work as expected. This function is called
for because it might be difficult to see the full meaning of XML schema
expressions by examining the textual representation of the schema.
The correctness tool lets the system administrator define a set of mes-
sages that are supposed to be valid and another set of messages supposed
to be invalid. These messages are uploaded through a web-based GUI. The
GUI is depicted in figures 8.1 and 8.2. The upload section of the GUI is
seen in the upper part of the GUI screenshots.
When the messages are uploaded, the correctness tool runs the messages
through the validator and displays the status of each of the messages. If the
test fails (e.g. messages supposed to be invalid are considered valid by the
validator), this is indicated in the GUI.
The correctness tool uses green circles to depict valid input and red
squares to depict invalid input. Figure 8.1 shows an example of a correctness
report where input supposed to be invalid has been recognized as valid by
the validator. As can be seen from the screenshot, an exclamation mark is
used to notify the system administrator about this anomaly. Additionally, it
can be seen that a green circle is depicted where a red square was expected.
8.3 The Coverage Tool
The coverage tool was developed in order to allow the system administrator
to verify that he has protected all ports.
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Figure 8.1: Correctness Report with Invalid Policy
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Figure 8.2: Correctness Report with Valid Policy
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It might be hard to determine whether all web services are protected
by manually examining the configuration file. The coverage tool automates
this process and provides a GUI for displaying the results.
Figure 8.3 and 8.4 shows the coverage tool GUI. Figure 8.3 shows an
example where wrong configuration is revealed. The system administrator
has most likely thought that all web service ports are protected. However,
the coverage tool states that the port called Withdraw is not protected. The
system administrator should then change the configuration file in order to
protect the port.
Further, it can be seen from the figure whether the parameters uses
repository or WSDL XML schemas. This functionality was thoroughly ex-
plained in section 6.3.3.
8.4 Summary
This chapter has described the main functionality implemented in our work
with the master’s thesis. Mainly, three tools have been implemented. These
tools are the input validator, the coverage tool, and the correctness tool.
The next chapter will demonstrate the use of the implementation pre-
sented here by means of an example application.
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Figure 8.3: Coverage Report with Invalid Configuration
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Figure 8.4: Coverage Report with Valid Configuration
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Chapter 9
Adding Input Validation to
an Example Application
The detailed design of the input validation solution was completed in chapter
7, and in the previous chapter we described the resulting implementation.
In this chapter, we describe an example application that makes use of the
solution for adding input validation functionality.
9.1 Example Application Description
The example application is a simple banking application for deposit and
withdrawal of money. The application consists of two parts. The first part
resides on the server side and is a web service with two ports. One port
enables withdrawals and the other deposits. The second part of the appli-
cation is a Windows client application that provides a GUI for invoking the
web service. Using this Windows application, bank customers can withdraw
and deposit money via the web service.
The business rules for the application are that an amount between 0 and
1000 can be withdrawn, and that any positive amount can be deposited.
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The web service is implemented without thinking of input validation.
In code, there is no check on whether deposit or withdrawal amounts are
positive or negative. Further, there is no check on amount limit. Before
adding input validation, the application therefore accepts all input.
9.1.1 Adding Encryption, Integrity and Authentication
After developing the above-described, naive implementation of the web ser-
vice, we add security. By using the Microsoft .NET implementation of WS-
Policy and WS-Security, called Web Services Enhancements (WSE), we add
encryption, integrity, and authentication.
All security added by WSE can be configured in an XML configuration
file. We also use the XML configuration file to add input validation at a
later stage.
9.1.2 Withdrawing Money Without Input Validation
Before adding input validation functionality, the application is run and in-
valid values are entered. In figure 9.1, we see that the application does not
prevent the user from withdrawing more than 1000.
9.2 Adding Input Validation
We now demonstrate how the solution described in this thesis can be em-
ployed to add input validation functionality to the example application. This
process consists of three steps:
1. Step 1: Define input validation policy
2. Step 2: Create mapping definition
3. Step 3: Verify policy and mapping using the web-based validation
tools
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Figure 9.1: Withdrawing Money without Input Validation
We now go through each of these steps.
9.2.1 Step 1: Define Input Validation Policy
As both web service ports receive an account number as one of their input
parameters, we want to reuse the validation logic for account numbers. The
restriction is specified using a regular expression that says that an account
number must be on the form “dddd.dd.ddddd”, where each “d” symbolizes
a digit.
We are unable to reuse the logic for the amounts that are deposited and
withdrawn as they have different restrictions; the withdraw amount must
be between 0 and 1000, while the only restriction for the deposit amount is
that it must be positive.
The input validation policy for account number, withdraw amount, and
deposit amount is shown below.
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<repository xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema">
<xsd:schema>
<!-- the withdrawn amount must be
between 0 and 1000, inclusive -->
<xsd:element name="withdrawAmountSchema">
<xsd:simpleType>
<xsd:restriction base="xsd:double">
<xsd:minInclusive value="0"/>
<xsd:maxInclusive value="1000"/>
</xsd:restriction>
</xsd:simpleType>
</xsd:element>
<!-- the deposited amount must be positive -->
<xsd:element name="depositAmountSchema">
<xsd:simpleType>
<xsd:restriction base="xsd:double">
<xsd:minInclusive value="0"/>
</xsd:restriction>
</xsd:simpleType>
</xsd:element>
<!-- an account number must be on the form
1234.12.12345 -->
<xsd:element name="accountNumberSchema">
<xsd:simpleType>
<xsd:restriction base="xsd:string">
<xsd:pattern value="\d{4}.\d{2}.\d{5}" />
</xsd:restriction>
</xsd:simpleType>
</xsd:element>
</xsd:schema>
</repository>
9.2.2 Step 2: Create Mapping Definition
After having defined the policy elements that we need, it is time to define
the mapping between the web service and policy. For our web service, we
will allow SOAP envelopes addressed to three different URIs, which all point
to the same web service.
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Further, we define mappings for both the Deposit and Withdraw ports.
The account numbers both use the same policy element, and the amounts
use individual elements, as described above.
The resulting mapping is shown below.
<mapping>
<webservice>
<!-- the URI synonyms that the web service can
be contacted on -->
<uris>
<uri>http://localhost:1675/BankingService/
BankingService.asmx</uri>
<uri>http://127.0.0.1:1675/BankingService/
BankingService.asmx</uri>
<uri>http://129.241.209.203:1675/BankingService/
BankingService.asmx</uri>
</uris>
<!-- the ports that the web service contains -->
<ports>
<port name="Deposit" namespace="http://tempuri.org/">
<param name="accountNumber"
schemaId="accountNumberSchema" />
<param name="amount"
schemaId="depositAmountSchema"/>
</port>
<port name="Withdraw" namespace="http://tempuri.org/">
<param name="accountNumber"
schemaId="accountNumberSchema" />
<param name="amount"
schemaId="withdrawAmountSchema"/>
</port>
</ports>
</webservice>
</mapping>
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9.2.3 Step 3: Verify the Configuration
Before employing the policy and mapping, it is important to verify that they
are configured correctly. First, we use the correctness tool to make sure that
the policy is defined as intended. Then, using the coverage tool we make
sure that the mapping is correct. Both tools were depicted and described in
chapter 8.
Correctness
The first step to test correctness is to create a set of valid and invalid mes-
sages for each web service port. An example of such a test set is shown
below.
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" ?>
<definitions xmlns="http://www.item.ntnu.no/ws">
<webservice>
<!-- the URI synonyms that the web service will
be contacted on -->
<uris>
<uri>http://localhost:1675/BankingService/
BankingService.asmx</uri>
<uri>http://127.0.0.1:1675/BankingService/
BankingService.asmx</uri>
<uri>http://129.241.209.203:1675/BankingService/
BankingService.asmx</uri>
</uris>
<!-- the ports that will be checked -->
<port name="Withdraw" namespace="http://tempuri.org/">
<!-- the valid messages that are sent to the
Withdraw port -->
<validMessages>
<message>
<accountNumber>9999.99.99999</accountNumber>
<amount>1000</amount>
</message>
<message>
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<accountNumber>1111.11.11111</accountNumber>
<amount>0</amount>
</message>
</validMessages>
<!-- the invalid messages that are sent to the
Withdraw port -->
<invalidMessages>
<message>
<accountNumber>1234..12345</accountNumber>
<amount>500</amount>
</message>
<message>
<accountNumber>1234.56.12345</accountNumber>
<amount>1001</amount>
</message>
</invalidMessages>
</port>
<port name="Deposit" namespace="http://tempuri.org/">
<!-- the valid messages that are sent to the
Deposit port -->
<validMessages>
<message>
<accountNumber>9999.99.99999</accountNumber>
<amount>1000000</amount>
</message>
<message>
<accountNumber>1111.11.11111</accountNumber>
<amount>0</amount>
</message>
</validMessages>
<!-- the invalid messages that are sent to the
Deposit port -->
<invalidMessages>
<message>
<accountNumber>1234..12345</accountNumber>
<amount>500</amount>
</message>
<message>
<accountNumber>bank</accountNumber>
<amount>1001</amount>
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</message>
<message>
<accountNumber>1234.56.12345</accountNumber>
<amount>-1</amount>
</message>
</invalidMessages>
</port>
</webservice>
</definitions>
To illustrate the operation of the correctness tool, we first apply it with
an error in the security policy. The policy has been configured to allow
withdrawals up to 10 000, instead of 1 000, which is the correct limit for the
example application.
The result of the correctness test was shown in figure 8.1 (page 79).
We see that a message specified as invalid in the test set has been found
to be valid by the validator. In the message, the amount is set to 1 001,
which is not allowed according to the intended policy. However, due to the
misconfiguration, this message was found valid. This discrepancy is marked
with a red exclamation mark in the report.
Then, we correct the policy by setting the maximum amount to 1 000
and re-run the test. The result, showing that all valid messages were found
to be valid, and all invalid messages found to be invalid, was shown in figure
8.2 (page 80).
Coverage
Next, we want to make sure that the mapping has been defined correctly.
To illustrate how the tool works, we have run the tool with an error in the
mapping. The error was that validation was turned off for the Withdraw
port. In figure 8.3 (page 82), we see that this is clearly pointed out in the
report.
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When the coverage tool is run with a correct mapping definition, the
result is as shown in figure 8.4 (page 83).
9.2.4 Withdrawing Money With Input Validation
After having validated correctness and coverage of our input validation def-
initions, we run the banking application again. Using the same input as in
the beginning of the chapter, we now experience that the input validation
system rejects the input as invalid. The result is shown in figure 9.2.
Figure 9.2: Withdrawing Money with Input Validation
9.3 Summary
This chapter has demonstrated use of the input validation mechanism de-
veloped during this master’s thesis work. We developed an example appli-
cation and added security to this application. We showed that it was easy
and straight-forward to add input validation to an existing web service, and
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to verify the validation policy and mapping using the web-based tools that
have been implemented.
It should be noted that all security mechanisms are added out of code in
an XML configuration file. Thus, the application code is not affected after
adding our mechanisms.
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Chapter 10
Conclusions
10.1 Conclusions
This thesis describes the design and implementation of a web service input
validation mechanism. The mechanism is realized by extending existing web
services security standards, such as WS-Security and WS-Policy.
To cover the requirements in the problem statement, the mechanism is
centralized and operates without human intervention. Further, it can be
verified for correctness and coverage using a web-based verification tool.
Additionally, web services protection can be added at deployment time,
without modifying existing code.
Last, the thesis demonstrates how the input validation mechanism can be
added to an existing application, and how it can be configured and verified
to ensure that it operates correctly.
10.2 Summary of Contributions
The major contributions of this work are:
• An examination of XML, web services, web services security, and input
validation.
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• A detailed design of an automatic, verifiable, and centralized web ser-
vice input validation mechanism that can be added to and configured
for a web service at deployment time.
• An implementation of the detailed design.
• Elaboration of the implementation by means of an example applica-
tion.
10.3 Future Research
Suggestions for future research based on this thesis are:
• More use of flexibility: The design allows for much more flexibility
than what has been explored in the described implementation. In
regard to flexibility, at least four types of extensions can be envisioned:
– An interesting extension of this work would be to make use of
the security information available from WS-Security and WS-
Policy in the security policies. One example would be to make a
requirement that a given web service port can only be called by
a certain set of users, who can then, in turn, be authenticated by
digital certificates. This way, the mechanism would function like
a web service firewall.
– A second way to extend the current design would be to add func-
tionality for auditing and billing. By using authentication pro-
vided by WS-Security or another source, it would be possible to
record the users’ service usage. Thus, one could use these records
for billing or to determine which user performed a certain web
service call in the past. This information could be used for non-
repudiation purposes.
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– Third, the system could be extended to function as an intrusion
detection system (IDS). Such a system could look for either sta-
tistical anomalies or for usage patterns that violate certain rules
that have been specified [48].
– Fourth, this thesis addresses only simple input validation. Pa-
rameters are validated independently of each other. We see op-
portunities for future work with extending this functionality by
letting validation depend on the relationships between different
parameters (e.g. the value of parameter A determines the valid
range of parameter B).
• Validation of output: The current design only allows validation
of input to web services. In certain situations it is also desirable to
validate the output from a web service. Such validation could be useful
to ensure that web services do not return unwanted information, for
instance in the case of programming errors, or as an extra layer of
security.
• Formal verification: The type of verification that has been designed
and implemented in this thesis could be formalized. Then, it might
be possible to mathematically prove the correct operation of the input
validation mechanism. However, such formalization might also make
the system less user friendly.
• Graphical configuration: A useful extension could be to develop
graphical tools to assist with configuration of security policies and
mappings. Such tools would make the job of configuring much more
efficient and less error-prone.
• Distributed policy definitions: We see a potential benefit in devel-
oping a system for distributing policy definitions. Such a system could
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let web services on different locations share a common, distributed pol-
icy. This would allow for reuse on a larger scale than that which is
possible between web services on the same server.
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Appendix A
Web Services Protocols
A.1 SOAP
A.1.1 SOAP Message Format
The Envelope Element
Versioning is the envelope’s main purpose. Thus, the envelope element tag
must include the SOAP version used. Versions are referred to by using XML
namespaces, which are uniquely identified by an URI. The following exam-
ple illustrates a typical envelope tag, which uses the SOAP 1.2 namespace
(http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/):
<SOAP-ENV:Envelope
xmlns=http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/>
The Header Element
The header element is optional and is often used for adding additional ap-
plication specific information about the SOAP message. Such application
information can typically be description of digital signature, authentication
information or payment information.
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The default namespace defines three attributes to the header element:
actor, mustUnderstand and encodingStyle. These attributes contain infor-
mation about how the SOAP message shall be processed.
The actor attribute defines the endpoint for which the message is in-
tended. Use of this attribute is especially interesting when a message is to
traverse several endpoint on it way to the intended endpoint. The actor at-
tribute is set by an URI (e.g. soap:actor=http://www.item.ntnu.no/appl/).
The mustUnderstand attribute tells whether the entry is mandatory or
optional for the receiver to process. The mustUnderstand attribute is set
to a Boolean value (the syntax is soap:mustUnderstand = 1 (or 0)).If the
mustUnderstand element is set to 1, the element must be recognized by the
processing endpoint. If the element is not recognized, the processing of the
header must stop.
The encodingStyle attribute defines the data types used in the SOAP
message. encodingStyle can be applied to any element in a SOAP mes-
sage and adds great flexibility to SOAP encoding. There is no standard
SOAP encoding scheme. The encodingStyle attribute is set to a URI, e.g.
soap:encodingStyle = http://www.item.ntnu.no/soap-enc/.
An example of an SOAP header element that illustrates use of all three
attributes:
<soap:Header>
<ex:accountNumber
xmlns:ex = http://www.item.ntnu.no/example
soap:mustUnderstand=1
soap:actor=http://www.item.ntnu.no/appl/
soap:encodingStyle = http://www.item.ntnu.no/soap-enc/>
1615.70.25551
</ex:accountNumber>
</soap:Header>
The Body Element
The body element is mandatory and includes the data intended for the
endpoint. Data requests and responses are typical contents of this element.
The following example illustrates a request body:
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<soap:body>
<ex:GetCredit
xmlns:m="http://www.item.ntnu.no/namespace/">
<ex:AccountType>
primaryAccount
</ex:AccountType>
</ex:GetCredit>
</soap:body>
This illustrates a response body for the request:
<soap:body>
<ex:GetCreditResponse
xmlns:m="http://www.item.ntnu.no/namespace/>
<ex:Credit>
1298.15
</ex:Credit>
</ex:GetCredit>
</soap:body>
The Fault Element
The last element of the SOAP message is the Fault element. This element
is used for error messages. Such messages can, as an example, be triggered
by the processing endpoint if it does not recognize an element where the
mustUnderstand attribute is set to 1. The standard defines several fault
codes for use. When interested in more details on fault codes, the reader is
referred to [19].
A.2 WSDL
A.2.1 WSDL elements
In order to get a better understanding of the standard we take a closer look
at the different elements in the WSDL standard. The different elements
are depicted in figure A.1We have made a simple example of a web service
called LightwightCalculator. The LighweightCalculator webservicehas only
one method called AddIntegers. AddIntegers takes two integers (addend a
and addend b) as input parameters and returns the sum of the integers.
Samples of the resulting WSDL code is used to illustrate use of the different
WSDL elements.
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Figure A.1: WSDL Document Format
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Definitions
The definitions element must be the root element in any WSDL document.
The definitions tag specifies the name of the web service and namespaces
for use later in the document. The example simply illustrates definitions
of namespaces. Between definitions begin and end tags, all other WSDL
elements are placed (this space is marked .. here).
<wsdl:definitions
xmlns:soap="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/wsdl/soap/"
xmlns:tm="http://microsoft.com/wsdl/mime/textMatching/"
xmlns:soapenc="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/encoding/"
xmlns:mime="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/wsdl/mime/"
xmlns:tns="http://tempuri.org/"
xmlns:s="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"
xmlns:soap12="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/wsdl/soap12/"
xmlns:http="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/wsdl/http/"
targetNamespace="http://tempuri.org/"
xmlns:wsdl="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/wsdl/">
..
</wsdl:definitions>
Types
The type element specifies all data types used by sender and receiver. From
the following example the reader can easily recognize the method name
AddIntegers and the two input parameters addend a and addend b. Further
one should observe that the response from the AddInteger method is defined
as AddIntegersResult and that this response is of the type int.
<wsdl:types>
<s:schema
elementFormDefault="qualified"
targetNamespace="http://tempuri.org/">
<s:element name="AddIntegers">
<s:complexType>
<s:sequence>
<s:element minOccurs="1" maxOccurs="1"
name="addend_a" type="s:int" />
<s:element minOccurs="1" maxOccurs="1"
name="addend_b" type="s:int" />
</s:sequence>
</s:complexType>
</s:element>
<s:element name="AddIntegersResponse">
<s:complexType>
<s:sequence>
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<s:element minOccurs="1" maxOccurs="1"
name="AddIntegersResult" type="s:int" />
</s:sequence>
</s:complexType>
</s:element>
</s:schema>
</wsdl:types>
Message
When namespaces and types are defined, the next task is to define the
SOAP message names. The messages must have unique names, and the
messages must be defined only one way. As can be seen from the example,
the AddInteger method results in two messages called AddIntegersSoapIn
and AddIntegersSoapOut:
<wsdl:message name="AddIntegersSoapIn">
<wsdl:part name="parameters"
element="tns:AddIntegers" />
</wsdl:message>
<wsdl:message name="AddIntegersSoapOut">
<wsdl:part name="parameters"
element="tns:AddIntegersResponse" />
</wsdl:message>
PortType
The PortType field defines the functions available in the service, and tells
which messages are associated with which methods. In the example, the
AddInteger method and SOAP messages are linked together to one opera-
tion:
<wsdl:portType name="LightweightCalculatorSoap">
<wsdl:operation name="AddIntegers">
<wsdl:input message="tns:AddIntegersSoapIn" />
<wsdl:output message="tns:AddIntegersSoapOut" />
</wsdl:operation>
</wsdl:portType>
Binding
The binding element has a reference to the PortType name, and defines
how the PortType operation should be sent. HTTP is the typical choice for
transport, but SMTP and FTP are other possible choices.
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<wsdl:binding
name="LightweightCalculatorSoap"
type="tns:LightweightCalculatorSoap">
<soap:binding
transport="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/http" />
<wsdl:operation name="AddIntegers">
<soap:operation
soapAction="http://tempuri.org/AddIntegers"
style="document" />
<wsdl:input>
<soap:body use="literal" />
</wsdl:input>
<wsdl:output>
<soap:body use="literal" />
</wsdl:output>
</wsdl:operation>
</wsdl:binding>
Service
The final element, the service element, defines the service location. The ex-
ample shows that the service named LightweightCalculator can be found on
the given IP-address (localhost in this case), the given TCP port (1493) and
at the given path (WebSite6/Service.asmx).Remark here that the service
name LightweightCalculator is linked to the PortType name Lightweight-
CalculatorSoap. The function described in the PortType is available in the
Service.asmx file, which contains the actual web service.
<wsdl:service name="LightweightCalculator">
<wsdl:port
name="LightweightCalculatorSoap"
binding="tns:LightweightCalculatorSoap">
<soap:address
location="http://localhost:1493/WebSite6/Service.asmx" />
</wsdl:port>
</wsdl:service>
A.3 UDDI
Companies that want to publish their services must register with the UDDI
repository. By doing this, the companies make their services publicly avail-
able. Information is stored hierarchically in the repository. The XML struc-
ture of the stored data is shown below:
<publisherAssertion>
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<businessEntity>
<businessService>
<bindingTemplate>
<tModel/>
<tModel/>
.
.
.
<tModel/>
</bindingTemplate>
</businessService>
<businessService>
.
.
.
</businessService>
.
.
.
<businessService>
.
.
.
</businessService>
</businessEntity>
</publisherAssertion>
For each business represented in the repository, there is a businessEntity
element. The businessEntity element describes the business and the location
of the business. Inside each businessEntity, there is at least one business ser-
vice element. The businessService element holds the name and description
of a given service. Inside the business service element, the bindingTem-
plate is found. The content of the bindingTemplate element is a pointer
to the service. This pointer typically consists of a URI to the WSDL file.
Furthermore, technical data is included in the tModel (technical model)
element. Such technical data often concern invocation of the service and
typical examples of technical data are information about input and output
parameters.
Hollar [37, p109] compares the contents of an UDDI repository with that
of a telephone book. The UDDI white pages contain plain contact informa-
tion about the business. UDDI yellow pages provide a deeper description
of the business, while the UDDI green pages describe the actual service and
the URI where the service can be found. The observant reader can thus see
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that white pages correspond to the businessEntity element, the yellow pages
correspond to the businessService element, and the green pages correspond
to the bindingTemplate element,
As mentioned above, UDDI is intended used for both publishing and
consumption of web services. In order to realize this, UDDI specifies two
APIs. For consumers, the Inquiry API is defined. By using the Inquiry API,
users get able to browse and search the tree structure of the repository. The
Inquiry API does also include methods for getting the data when service
consumers have found what they were looking for. Publishers have their
own API, the Publish API. Through this API, service providers can register
their services with the repository. After publishing, the providers may also
edit and delete their services through this API.
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Appendix B
XML Encryption and XML
Signature
In this chapter we provide an illustration of the operation of XML Encryp-
tion and XML Signature. The following XML message will be used for
illustration.
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" ?>
<Order>
<ItemId>7817</ItemId>
<Amount>2</Amount>
<Name>John Doe</Name>
<CreditCardNumber>1234 5678 9012 3456</CreditCardNumber>
</Order>
B.1 XML Encryption
We will now demonstrate how XML Encryption works by encrypting the
CreditCardNumber element in the XML document above.
We chose to encrypt the element using a session key that is encrypted
with a shared key. As can be seen from the result below, the credit card
details are replaced with an EncryptedData element, consisting of Encryp-
tionMethod, KeyInfo, and CipherData elements. The EncryptionMethod
element says that 256-bit AES was used in CBC-mode. The key described
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in the KeyInfo element (removed for brevity) was used for encryption, and in
the CipherData element we find the encrypted version of the original XML
element.
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<Order>
<ItemId>7817</ItemId>
<Amount>2</Amount>
<Name>John Doe</Name>
<EncryptedData
Type="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#Element"
xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#">
<EncryptionMethod
Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#aes256-cbc" />
<KeyInfo xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#">
<EncryptedKey
xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#">
[the encrypted key and associated information]
</EncryptedKey>
</KeyInfo>
<CipherData>
<CipherValue>
[the encrypted CreditCardNumber element]
</CipherValue>
</CipherData>
</EncryptedData>
</Order>
It is clear from the previous example that XML encryption introduces a
significant amount of overhead compared to a cleartext XML document.
B.2 XML Signature
To illustrate the operation of XML Signatures, the original XML document
presented in the beginning of this chapter will be signed. The resulting XML
document is shown below.
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" ?>
<Order>
<ItemId>7817</ItemId>
<Amount>2</Amount>
<Name>John Doe</Name>
<CreditCardNumber>1234 5678 9012 3456</CreditCardNumber>
<Signature xmlns="http://www.w3c.org/2000/09/xmldsig#">
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<SignedInfo>
<CanonicalizationMethod
Algorithm="http://www.w3c.org/TR/2001/REC-xml-c14n-20010315"/>
<SignatureMethod
Algorithm="http://www.w3c.org/2000/09/xmldsig#rsa-sha1"/>
<Reference URI="">
<Transforms>
<Transform
Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#enveloped-signature"/>
</Transforms>
<DigestMethod
Algorithm="http://www.w3c.org/2000/09/xmldsig#sha1"/>
<DigestValue>
[hash of the information that was signed]
</DigestValue>
</Reference>
</SignedInfo>
<SignatureValue>
[the digital signature]
</SignatureValue>
</Signature>
</Order>
We see that a Signature element, consisting of a SignedInfo and a Signa-
tureValue element, was added to the original document. SignedInfo specifies
the method of canonicalization1, specifies that signing is performed by creat-
ing a SHA-1 hash of the orignal document, found in the DigestValue element,
and then signing this hash using RSA and an agreed-upon RSA key not spec-
ified in the document. The signature can be found in the SignatureValue
element.
Just like XML encryption, XML signing introduces a significant over-
head.
1Canonicalization is performed in order to ensure that two semantically identical XML
documents are regarded as identical, e.g. when two elements have switched places.
120 B. XML Encryption and XML Signature
Appendix C
Policy Mapping Format
The format that is used for mapping web services parameters to input policy
definitions is shown below. For the attributes where several choices are
possible (e.g. validate), the first alternative is the default one. This means
that is the validate attribute is not included for a port, this is equivalent to
including validate=”true”.
<mapping>
<webservice wsdlPath="path or URL to WSDL document, if used">
<uris>
<uri>http://synonym 1</uri>
.
.
.
<uri>http://synonym n</uri>
</uris>
<ports>
<port name="port name A" namespace="namespace" useWsdl="false|true" validate="true|false">
<param name="param 1" schemaId="schema 1" useWsdl="false|true" validate="true|false" />
.
.
.
<param name="param m" schemaId="schema t" useWsdl="false|true" validate="false|true" />
</port>
.
.
.
</ports>
</webservice>
.
.
.
</mapping>
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